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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
l-.TATF OV UTAH, t 
Plaint if i-K<-bj»..»n.ifiii No. 890350-CA 
s 
ROBERT D. LOVEGREN, and : Category No. 2 
GREGORY SOUTHERN, 
Defendants-Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDlCli'JN AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal ? : z* ~TS ol i' .'^ session of; a 
controlled substance v, .* f. ::;*- t cistribute, a second degree 
felony, und ' | | a) pv ;, . 989). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hecii - ^ r 
Utah code Ann, * - •) (Supp 1989). 
STATEMENT w ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Based on the nature of the pleas entered hy delendd" ii 
ami I'i'i i epted by the trial court, the sole issue on appeal is 
whether defendants ar e pi: eel tided from lleging denial of their 
rights under the fourth amendment .: ^  ^ cites 
Corif-1 i, tui IPP and artxcie * section • 5 j i i Constitution 
as a ground for reverse 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
MrlfMiflni text ui statutory provisions pertinent to the 
resolution i:l tin issue presen - - stained in the 
body of this briei. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants, Robert D. Lovegren and Gregory Southern, 
were charged with possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute, a second degree felony, under Utah Code 
Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1989), and four misdemeanors: 
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, obstruction of 
justice, open container in a motor vehicle, and interference with 
a police officer (R. 17-18). Pursuant to a plea bargain, 
defendants entered and the trial court accepted pleas of no 
contest to the felony charge of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute; the misdemeanor charges were 
dismissed (R. 63-82). The trial court sentenced each defendant 
to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, but 
stayed execution of those sentences and continued defendants' 
release on bail pending appeal (R. 86-89). The court 
subsequently issued a certificate of probable cause (R. 90-91). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are pertinent to the issue of 
whether defendants are precluded from alleging denial of their 
rights under the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
as a ground for reversal of their convictions. 
Prior to entering their no contest pleas, defendant 
filed motions to suppress evidence that was seized by a police 
officer pursuant to a stop and search of their vehicle (R. 41). 
Defendant Southern's motion to suppress, a copy of which is 
appended to his brief on appeal, does not appear to be in the 
record on appeal. However, it is clear that both defendants 
-2-
The trial court denied the motion (R. 54, 190). Thereafter, 
defendants entered pleas of no contest to the possession with 
intent to distribute charge, which were accepted by the court (R. 
81-82)• In its signed minute entry concerning the taking of the 
pleas, the court stated in pertinent part: 
This was the time set for trial of the 
above-named defendants. The State of Utah 
appeared by and through Deputy County 
Attorney James Taylor. Defendant Southern 
appeared in person and through attorney 
Michael Esplin. Defendant Lovegren appeared 
in person and through attorney Thomas Means. 
A jury was not called pursuant to the 
representation of defendants' counsel that 
the defendants wished to withdraw their not 
guilty plea and enter a plea of no contest. 
The Court advised the defendants 
individually and fully of their consti-
tutional rights and of the consequences of 
entering a plea of no contest. Mr. Taylor 
stated plea negotiations on the record which 
are that the State has agreed to, upon the 
defendants entering a plea of no contest to 
Count I - Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, dismiss 
Count II - Unlawful Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, Count 
III - Obstruction of Justice, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, Count IV - Open Container in 
Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor, and 
Count V - Interference with a Peace Officer, 
a Class B Misdemeanor. Mr. Taylor stated the 
factual basis for the charge in the 
Information. The Court allowed defendants to 
withdraw their not guilty pleas. The 
defendants were sworn individually, advised 
individually by the Court of their rights, 
and executed the Statement by Defendant in 
open court. Defendants entered a plea of NO 
CONTEST to the crime of Count I - Possession 
of a Controlled Substance With Intent to 
Distribute, a Second Degree Felony as charged 
in the Information. Affidavit of Counsel was 
submitted to the Court. The Court accepts 
said plea finding it has been entered 
Cont. joined in the motion to suppress (R. 53A-55, 98-192). 
-3-
knowingly, with full understanding of their 
rights, that it was entered freely and 
voluntarily, without force, threat, or 
promise of reward and finding there is a 
factual basis for the plea. Mr. Means and 
Mr. Esplin advised the Court of 
interlineations made to the Statement in 
Advance of Plea in order to plead no contest. 
(R. 81-82) (a copy of the entire minute entry is contained in 
Appendix A). In defendant Lovegren's signed "Statement By 
Defendant Before Pleading No Contest," which the court referred 
to in its minute entry, one paragraph reads: 
The State will dismiss counts II, III, IV & 
V, and stipulates that defendant retains the 
right to appeal the judgment in return for 
defendant's plea of "no contest" to count I. 
(R. 67) (a copy of the complete statement is contained in 
Appendix B). In a similar statement signed by defendant Southern 
one paragraph reads: 
State will dismiss Counts II - V of 
information and will stipulate to defendant's 
right to appeal. 
(R. 76) (a copy of the complete statement is contained in 
Appendix C). No reference to preservation of suppression issues 
appears in either statement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because defendants, in entering their pleas of no 
contest, failed to explicitly preserve suppression issues for 
appeal, as required by State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), they are precluded from alleging denial of their rights 
under the fourth amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah 




BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD ON 
APPEAL TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DEFENDANTS ENTERED 
AND THE TRIAL COURT ACCEPTED CONDITIONAL NO 
CONTEST PLEAS THAT SPECIFICALLY PRESERVED THE 
SUPPRESSION ISSUE FOR APPEAL, DEFENDANTS ARE 
PRECLUDED FROM ALLEGING DENIAL OF THEIR 
RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 14 AS A GROUND FOR REVERSAL OF 
THEIR CONVICTIONS. 
On appeal, defendants attack the trial court's denial 
of their joint motion to suppress evidence seized by a police 
officer from defendants' vehicle pursuant to a traffic stop. 
They claim that the seizure violated the fourth amendment and 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. However, they 
fail to discuss whether that issue is cognizable on appeal after 
the entry and acceptance of their no contest pleas. They simply 
assume that the issue is properly before the Court. 
A plea of no contest, although it indicates only that 
the defendant does not challenge the charges in the information 
or indictment, has the same effect as a plea of guilty. Utah 
Code Ann. S 77-13-2(3) (1982). It is settled law that a 
voluntary guilty plea or no contest plea is a waiver of the right 
to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues, including alleged pre-
plea constitutional violations (e.g., fourth amendment issues). 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. 
Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See 
also State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978) (per curiam); State 
v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977). However, in Sery, this Court 
created an exception to this general rule, noting that 
-5-
[it] is inapplicable where . . . the plea 
entered by the defendant with the consent of 
the prosecution and accepted by the trial 
judge specifically preserves the suppression 
issue for appeal and allows withdrawal of the 
plea if defendant's arguments in favor of 
suppression are accepted by the appellate 
court, 
758 P.2d at 938 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added). The question in the instant case is whether defendants' 
no contest pleas satisfy the requirements of Sery regarding 
conditional pleas. 
In State v. Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah Ct. 
2 
App. 1988) (hereafter referred to as Mclntire I), this Court had 
before it a similar issue. After the trial court had denied his 
motion to suppress, Mclntire pleaded guilty to several charges. 
This Court determined that the guilty plea was unconditional, and 
was entered freely, voluntarily and intelligently (as noted supra 
at fn. 2, the Court subsequently discovered that the plea was not 
unconditional). Based on those facts and the absence of any 
language in the guilty plea "conditioning the plea on Mclntire's 
right to appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to 
suppress," the Court held that Mclntire was precluded from 
raising fourth amendment issues on appeal. 93 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
19. 
The opinion in Mclntire I was withdrawn prior to publication in 
the Pacific Reporter because the Court subsequently learned that 
Mclntire had actually entered a conditional plea and therefore, 
under Sery, was not precluded from raising fourth amendment 
issues on appeal. State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 971 n.2 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). The State cites the first opinion not as 
published precedent, but simply for its discussion of the issue 
presented here. 
•6-
As in Mclntire If the pleas entered by defendants (as 
reflected in the record on appeal) do not contain specific 
language which preserves the suppression issue for appeal. 
Neither the statements signed by defendants for purposes of their 
pleas nor the trial court's signed minute entry concerning the 
acceptance of the pleas contains such language. As noted in this 
brief's statement of facts, defendants' signed plea statements 
merely refer to the retention of "the right to appeal the 
judgment" (defendant Lovegren's statement) and "defendant's right 
to appeal" (defendant Southern's statement). More importantly, 
the trial court's signed minute entry, which is the only 
documentation in the appellate record of the taking of 
defendants' pleas, makes no reference whatsoever to a conditional 
plea or the preservation of suppression issues for appeal. In 
short, the specific requirements of Sery for the entry of a 
conditional plea were not met—requirements that were plainly set 
forth by the Sery Court approximately seven months prior to the 
time defendants entered their pleas on February 27, 1989 (R. 81-
82). The vague references in defendants' statements to retention 
of the right to appeal are not sufficient under Sery. Without 
more specificity, those references can, at most, refer to 
defendants' usual right to appeal the jurisdiction of the court, 
the voluntariness of the plea, or the sentence imposed. Because 
a conditional plea of the sort approved in Sery is not expressly 
authorized by statute or rule (and has never been approved by the 
7-
3 
Utah Supreme Court ), the requirement that there be an explicit 
preservation of the suppression issue in the entry and acceptance 
of the plea is all the more important. Because the record does 
not reflect compliance with this critical requirement, this Court 
should decline to reach the search and seizure issues raised by 
defendants and affirm their convictions, just as it did under 
4 
similar circumstances in Mclntire I. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, this Court should 
affirm defendants' convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /fl^^day of October, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON V 
Assistant Attorney General 
3 
Indeed, there is some question about how the Utah Supreme Court 
would rule on the issue if presented with it. See Seryf 758 P.2d 
at 949-50 (Davidson, J., dissenting) (where Judge Davidson 
presents a thoughful argument against the conditional plea 
approved by the majority). 
4 
It may well be that defendants believed they were entering 
conditional no contest pleas pursuant to Sery. However, the 
record before this Court simply does not demonstrate that fact. 
If the procedure followed in the trial court was in fact 
deficient in producing the desired conditional no contest pleas, 
defendants may be entitled to postconviction relief under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B(i). See Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6(2)(b) & (3) (Supp. 
1989) (which provide that a request to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest must be made within 30 days after entry of the 
plea, but that the section does not preclude relief under Rule 
65B(i)). 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Thomas H. Means, Attorney for Appellant Lovegren, 363 North 
University Ave., Suite 103, Provo, Utah 84601 and Michael D. 
Esplin, Attorney for Appellant Southern, 43 East 200 North, P.O. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
************* 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREGORY WADE SOUTHERN 
ROBERT D. LOVEGREN, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER: CR 88 294 
DATE: FEBRUARY 27, 1989 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
Rept.: Richard C. Tatton, CSR 
************** 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
This was the time set for trial of the above-named 
defendants. The State of Utah appeared by and through Deputy 
County Attorney James Taylor. Defendant Southern appeared in 
person and through attorney Michael Esplin. Defendant Lovegren 
appeared in person and through attorney Thomas Means. A jury was 
not called pursuant to the representation of defendants' counsel 
that the defendants wished to withdraw their not guilty plea and 
enter a plea of no contest. 
The Court advised the defendants individually and 
fully of their constitutional rights and of the consequences of 
entering a plea of no contest. Mr. Taylor stated plea 
negotiations on the record which are that the State has agreed 
to, upon the defendants entering a plea of no contest to Count 
I - Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute, dismiss Count II - Unlawful Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, Count III - Obstruction of 
Justice, a Class B Misdemeanor, Count IV - Open Container in 
Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Count V - Interference 
With a Peace Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor. Mr. Taylor stated 
the factual basis for the charge in the Information. The Court 
allowed defendants to withdraw their not guilty pleas. The 
defendants were sworn individually, advised individually by the 
Court of their rights, and executed the Statement by Defendant in 
open court. Defendants entered a plea of NO CONTEST to the crime 
of Count I - Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to 
Distribute, a Second Degree Felony as charged in the Information. 
Affidavit of Counsel was submitted to the Court. The Court 
accepts said plea finding it has been entered knowingly, with 
full understanding of their rights, that it was entered freely 
and voluntarily, without force, threat, or promise of reward and 
finding there is a factual basis for the plea. Mr. Means and 
Mr. Esplin advised the Court of interlineations made to the 
Statement in Advance of Plea in order to plead no contest. 
The defendants waived the statutory time in which to be 
sentenced. Upon motion of defendants this matter is referred to 
the Adult Probation and Parole Department for a presentence 
investigation and report. Defendants are to cooperate fully with 
the department. 
This matter is continued to the 28th day of April, 1989 
at the hour of 8:00 a.m. for pronouncement of sentence. 
Defendants are ordered to be present at that time. 
Mr. Esplin addressed the Court regarding a cash bail 
posted for Mr. Southern requesting that the amount of bail be 
reduced. The State stipulated to the same. Therefore, the Court 
ordered the bail for defendant Southern be reduced to $1,000.00. 
The balance of the bail is to be refunded. The bail for 
defendant Lovegren is to remain the same. 
Defendants are to remain released on bail until time 
fixed for sentencing or as otherwise ordered by the Court. 
Dated this 28th day of February, 1989. 
/1BY~TH^ COpRf ^ V 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
APPENDIX B 
CASE NUMBER ^T C *Z 2°lLf 
STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT 
BEFORE PLEADING €U1LT¥-
/JO C&VTG"5T 
J9B9FEB23 PH 3 = 3 1 f 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******** 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RtM^r yYTV; LcAAXtmu , 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * 
COMES NOW py^gx.1 wt-»v, Lo\j'^rx-^) the defendant in 
this case, and initials each paragraph below and signs this 
statement on page seven for the purpose of demonstrating to the 
Court that he or she understands the following; 
1. I understand that I am charged with the offense(s) 
degree felony, o r r a ^ =^=mtormnt*aneg. I 
have read the Information with my attorney and I understand what 
it s&ys. 
IcL 2. My attorney and I have fully discussed my case and 
how the charge (or charges) contained in the Information apply to 
me. 
/cL 3. I understand that, if I plead gsrtityto this charge 
(or these charges), I can be imprisoned or jailed for up to } -T 
years and that I can also receive a fine of up to $ )0 ckJcjP^T 
QL 4. I understand that the judge may sentence me to 
prison for jail for a~Trn sflrmf-anor) and also fine me, or that he 
can choose between these two possibilities. 
* f-^/A 5. I understand that if I am sentenced on more than 
one charge, the judge may allow my prison/jail terms for each 
charge to run at the same time (concurrently) or one after the 
other (consecutively). 
(cL 6. I understand that I have the right to be helped by 
an attorney throughout my entire case, including a trial and an 
appeal. If I cannot afford my own attorney, the judge will 
appoint one to help me. 
I understand that I have the right to plead "not 
guilty" and go to trial if I want to do so. 
8. I understand that I have the right to a jury trial, 
which includes the following: 
/Pi A. I have the right to be helped by an attorney; 
$L B. I have the right to see and listen to the 
witnesses who testify against me; 
KL C. My attorney can cross-examine all the 
witnesses who testify against me; 
tcL D. I can call my own witnesses to help me, and if 
they do not want to come to my trial, I can use subpoenas to 
make them come and testify on my behalf; 
£L E. I cannot be forced to take the witness stand 
and admit my guilt, and I do not have to testify at my trial 
unless I want to do so; 
AC F. If I decide not to testify, the jury will be 
instructed that they cannot assume that I am guilty just 
because I did not testify; 
KL G. I understand that I am presumed to be innocent 
of the charges against me, and that this presumption will 
end only if each member of the jury is convinced of my 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 
/CL H. If I go to trial and I am convicted, I have 
the right to appeal my conviction. If I cannot afford my 
own attorney for my appeal, the State will pay the costs of 
the appeal, including appointing an attorney to help me. 
/2L 9. I understand that during the trial the State has 
the burden of proving what are called "elements" of the charge 
(charges) against me. In my case the elements are as follows: 
£L _ A. That I ; V V ^ O ^ T £)**»*/ lz>sKOAc*J 
fit B. In U-rvqH County, State of Utah; 
fit E- vy *~- rVf^ T T1*^ lit*" 0ty°*lhM'f \^YT ; 
£k *• T o I ^ , T Coc*<AAr. A T>cHnfk;ur XT ; 
Qi 10. I understand thatf if I plead guilty to the charges 
contained in the Information, such a plea means that: A/UT T O 
KL A. My plea of guiity is an ariitTibfli<*n.-a£. all "^he 
Tc^T T^t elements listed in paragraph 9 above. 
$L B. I am giving up my right to a jury trial, my 
right to a presumption of my innocence, my right to see and 
cross-examine the witnesses against me, and my right not to 
testify; 
/It C. I am agreeing to allow the judge to find mr 
^ PcX^ /O guilty of the charge (charges) against me; 
(lU D. I am relieving the State of its job of 
proving me guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; 
QL E. I am agreeing to allow the judge to sentence 
me for my crime without the benefit of a jury trial; 
^TX^A, -*U 1 am ^M^dagiiggJ^y rlght^to apj^Tl^rhg^eraiixiL 
of-the Court* 
po ccyJTtrrr 
icL 11* I know that when I enter my plea of t^ailty, the 
judge may ask me questions under oath about the charges in this 
case. I must answer these questions, if they are asked on the 
record and in the presence of my attorney, and I can be 
prosecuted for perjury if I lie to the judge. 
fiL 12. I have entered into the following plea agreement 
with the State: 
Approved as to con^Wt 
Deputy Utah County Attochey 
#L 13. No threats or promises of any sort have been made 
to force me or to persuade me to enter into this plea agreement. 
(It 14. No one has promised me that I would receive a 
lighter sentence because I am pleading g m & t y instead of going to 
trial. 
15. My attorney has informed me as to the sentence I 
may actually receive if I plead guilty, but I understand that the 
Court is not bound by my attorney's words. 
jcL 16. I understand that any agreements made between my 
attorney and the State regarding recommendations for sentencing 
are not binding upon the Court. 
flL 17. My decision to enter this plea has been made after 
full and careful thought, with the advice of my attorney, and 
with a full understanding of my rights, the facts and 
circumstances of my case and the possible results of this plea. 
9*1*- 18. I have discussed this case and this plea with my 
attorney as much as I wish to do so. I am satisfied with the 
advice of my attorney. 
PL 19. My attorney has helped me understand and fill out 
this form. 
(It 20. I am not now under the influence of any drugs# 
medication or intoxicants, and I was not under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when my attorney and I went 
through this form. 
\m -^nteirtngT""a plea of gui^JLyTl^-The^ci*€HF^e— 
A charges) against—me-because I am, in fact, guilty of the charge 
(tfhairgesj.. 
KL 22. I know of no reason why I should not plead giLLLty 
to the charge (charges) contained in the Information. 
fit 23. I have the following educational background; 
°\ ^ T r i ? f*Z 0- ** A)*^<nt O^Lnt* yrV \SJ\LH *T<u V0 
fit 24. I can readf write, and understand the English 
language. 
fit 25. I am not presently being treated for mental illness 
that would affect my ability to voluntarily and knowingly make 
this gt^fty-plea. 
Signed in open court this <XC~7 of -r~/v*> # 
KOvtfT fstc** A&vt qre s~\ 
Defendant 
Counsel for Defendant 
d i s t r i c t Court Judge~~ 
APPENDIX C 
I9B9FEB 2 3 PH 3= 31 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
******** 
CASE NUMBER fl£*^S^ 
STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT 
BEFORE PLEADING - « « * * ¥ 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * 
COMES NOW (^c^OryCJcd* \a^^e^^ , the defendant in 
this case, and initials each paragraph below and signs this 
statement on page seven for the purpose of demonstrating to the 
Court that he or she understands the following: 
// J) 1. I understand that I am charged with the offense(s) 
a
 A *A degree felony, or a Class ______ misdemeanor. I 
have read the Information with my attorney and I understand what 
it says. 
/J* J) 2. My attorney and I have fully discussed my case and 
how the charge (or charges) contained in the Information apply to 
K. /} 3. I understand that, if I plead jnHty to this charge 
(or these charges), I can be imprisoned or jailed for up 
years and that I can also receive a fine of up to %/O OOe>,y 
pj 4. I understand that the judge may sentence me to 
prison (or jail for a misdemeanor) and also fine me, or that he 
can choose between these two possibilities. 
5. I understand that if I am sentenced on more than 
one charge, the judge may allow my prison/jail terms for each 
charge to run at the same time (concurrently) or one after the 
other (consecutively). 
# X 
A / , *& 6. I understand that I have the right to be helped by 
an attorney throughout my entire case, including a trial and an 
appeal. If I cannot afford my own attorney, the judge will 
appoint one to help me. 
7. I understand that I have the right to plead "not 
guilty* and go to trial if I want to do so. 
pP-/j 8. I understand that I have the right to a jury trial, 
which includes the following: 
A. I have the right to be helped by an attorney; 
B. I have the right to see and listen to the 
a 
witnesses who testify against me; 
_^J. JO. C. My attorney can cross-examine all the 
witnesses who testify against me; 
. Jj >Q. D. I can call my own witnesses to help me, and if 
they do not want to come to my trial, I can use subpoenas to 
make them come and testify on my behalf; 
Al E. I cannot be forced to take the witness stand 
and admit my guiltf and I do not have to testify at my trial 
unless I want to do so; 
P. If I decide not to testify, the jury will be 
instructed that they cannot assume that I am guilty just 
because I did not testify; 
G. I understand that I am presumed to be innocent 
of the charges against me, and that this presumption will 
end only if each member of the jury is convinced of my 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; 
H. If I go to trial and I am convicted, I have 
;
M. 
the right to appeal my conviction. If I cannot afford my 
own attorney for my appeal, the State will pay the costs of 
the appeal, including appointing an attorney to help me. 
9. I understand that during the trial the State has 
the burden of proving what are called "elements" of the charge 
(charges) against me. In my case the elements are as follows: 
A. That I; 
jO./y B. In U-t+«* County, State of Utah? 6//&/SS 
F. , 
6. 
10. I understand that, if I plead to the charges 
contained in the Information, such a plea means that: ~+ L^yz. /I 
ft X AO ccn\<:^ ^cubc^ * O* 
r-'S A. My plea of jgnfrl'iy is an admiucilon of all the 
com* elements listed in paragraph 9 above* 
M. B. I am giving up my right to a jury trial, my 
right to a presumption of my innocence, my right to see and 
cross-examine the witnesses against me, and my right not to 
testify; M_ C. I am agreeing to allow the judge to find me 
guilty of the charge (charges) against me; 
D. I am relieving the State of its job of 
proving me guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; 
E. I am agreeing to allow the judge to sentence 
M 
me for my crime without the benefit of a jury trial; 
o&jthe Court. 
/U> coAhrr 
11. I know that when I enter my plea of guilty, the 
judge may ask me questions under oath about the charges in this 
case. I must answer these questions, if they are asked on the 
record and in the presence of my attorney, and I can be 
prosecuted for perjury if I lie to the judge. 
I have entered into the following plea agreement 
with the State: 
attorney 
13. No threats or promises of any sort have been made 
to force me or to persuade me to enter into this plea agreement. 
14. No one has promised me that I would receive a 
no ccnJcrr-
lighter sentence because I am pleading g«££ty instead of going to 
trial. 
15. My attorney has informed me as to the sentence I 
I\A CCAHtr 
may actually receive if I plead .gsiSWy, but I understand that the 
Court is not bound by my attorney's words. 
H.AJ- 16. I understand that any agreements made between my 
attorney and the State regarding recommendations for sentencing 
are not binding upon the Court. 
M /). 17. My decision to enter this plea has been made after 
full and careful thought, with the advice of my attorney, and 
with a full understanding of my rights, the facts and 
circumstances of my case and the possible results of this plea. 
18. I have discussed this case and this plea with my 
attorney as much as I wish to do so. I am satisfied with the 
advice of my attorney. 
M 19. My attorney has helped me understand and fill out 
this form. 
I am not now under the i n f l u e n c e of any drugs, 
medication or i n t o x i c a n t s , and I was not under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when my attorney and I went 
through t h i s form. 
* am *T\Mr+*±*ia^r* T»l<a o^Hafl*3Qfty~ *°\ t h e \ c forge 
r;ai|se l^^^Lrr^tScfrf'qn^\^y &fr--fchg c h a r g e 
He con it jt 
/J, /l 22. I know of no reason why I should not plead 
to the charge (charges) contained in the Information. 
JUL 
23. I have the following educational background; 
i f L 
u. 24. I can read, write, and understand the English 
language. 
JUVL 25. I am not presently being treated for mental illness 
that would affect my ability to voluntarily and knowingly make 
this guilty plea. 
Signed in open court this c? 7 — of (~Q_ It rag* <> , 
19.23. 
Defendant / 77 
Counsel fofc Defendar 
g ^ X 7 ^ C ^ / *C^C 
D i s t r i c t Cburt iJudge 

